The condition of indivisibility in the problem of dividing a finite number of indivisible goods basically disables a division that is proportional to the claims of its participants. As a result, a need emerges to measure the disproportionality of a specific division, and in particular to answer the question what are the conditions for a given function to be a disproportionality index. The aim of the study is to define a minimum set of criteria defining the index of disproportionality taking into account the condition of the indivisibility of goods. Moreover to describe the selected properties of indices of disproportionality in order to facilitate the interpretation of the results of their use. In addition to the review and some form of classification of the functioning indices of disproportionality, a set of criteria is given which the disproportionality index should meet, in which the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle plays a key role. Most of the considerations are of a theoretical nature based on a mathematical apparatus. In selected cases, simulations were carried out on specific sets of divisions. A new index of disproportionality was defined, which is normalized weighted arithmetic mean in relation to the representation of claims regarding goods. Indices based on the vector norm order the set of divisions practically in the same way. Of the existing indices, the Least square index, the Sine index and the Saint-Lague index have outstanding properties, although the Saint-Lague index does not meet the normalized criterion.
Introduction
Distributing a finite set of identical and indivisible goods among participants with specific entitlements so as to best represent the structure of claims is an issue typically examined in the context of allocating mandates in legislative bodies among political parties based on ballots. In this paper, to emphasize a more general approach, the terms: a participant in allocation or an agent will be used as a replacement for political party, just as entitlements for ballots, a good for a mandate or a parliamentary seat.
The consequence of indivisibility in the issue of the separation of the finite number of indivisible goods is often the inability of division in proportion to the claims of its participants. In existing studies addressing the measurement of disproportionality, the condition of integer division is usually omitted.
Notation
Let us consider a set of possible divisions of a finite number s of goods among n agents subject to < where , ∈ ℕ and satisfying the assumptions that an agent with greater entitlements cannot get less than an agent with smaller entitlements. Let = ( + , , , … , . ) denote the vector of claims, i.e. the vector of weights corresponding to entitlements of agents, whereas one can assume without loss of generality that this vector is nondecreasing, i.e. if < then 2 ≤ 4 , and = ∑ 2 . 27+
. Let = ( + , , , … , . ) denote the vector defining the number of goods allocated to individual agents such that = ∑
. 27+
The set of these divisions will be denoted by ℝ < ( , ). If we also assume that the goods are indivisible, we get the set of integer divisions denoted by ℕ ( , ) and ( , ). This is a set of n-element nondecreasing vectors whose its reciprocal is the representativeness of goods with respect to claims for the i th agent.
Problem Statement

Proportional division
The division is called proportional with respect to if its structure S corresponds to structure of 3, 8) . Thus, the choice is ambiguous. Each vector of (1,2,5), (1,3,4) and (2,2,4) can be regarded as "near" to proportional division, because the term 'near' is not precise 1 .
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There is also a terminological problem. If one determines a vector of integers that is nearest to a proportional division, based on additional premises, it is typically called a proportional division. Hence, to avoid a terminological unambiguity, a proportional division that is not integer division will be called strictly proportional or quota division 2 , and will be denoted by * .
The lack of proportionality, i.e. disproportionality, can also result from additional conditions imposed on a division. For example, a rule can be introduced that to get a good, an agent must claim more than an expected threshold, or conversely, when it is expected that each participant in division must be allocated a certain number of goods, irrespective of the quantity of their claims.
The concept of index of disproportionality
The index of disproportionality, also termed as disproportionality measure, index of distortion, and deviation from proportionality, is a function allowing to delineate how much a given division is different from proportional division. A discourse continues onto the meaning of such an index, its desired properties, and determining which functions currently employed to this end are such an index, and which are not.
One can state that application of such index has a twofold purpose. First, to evaluate how much the division under study is different from the quota division, i.e. to what degree it deviates from proportionality.
Second, to establish an order in the set of integer deviations, i.e. ranking them so as to determine which one in any pair of divisions is nearer to a proportional division.
In 1991, Gallagher analyzed the properties of six indices used at that time, while in 1994, Monroe extended the investigation to nineteen indices. Similar studies were conducted by Taagepera and Grofman (2003) and by Karpov (2008) , whereas their sets of indices do not overlap. Koppel and Diskin (2009) , similarly as Chessa and Fragnelli (2012) , put forward additional indices. Certainly, these studies do not exhaust the topic, and the number of potential indices of disproportionality is infinite. The compilations focus on determining which index under study is better, i.e. satisfies more required criteria, whereas the choice of criteria in different papers is unlike. Taagepera and Grofman (2003) building on the work by Monroe (1994) , identified 12 different criteria: seven are theoretical and five are practical, such as ease of computations and unambiguity of results. Karpov (2008) considers five different properties axiomatically approached, whereas Koppel and Diskin (2009) examine eight. Some of these criteria are put forward in all mentioned reviews, they only differ in terms of wording. There are also some criteria proposed in just one paper, and some whose wording or the usage in compilation raise doubts.
A given function can be considered the index of proportionality if it has the property that it attains the minimum for a quota division, and its greater values indicate more disparity between the given division and the quota division. It should also meet the classical criteria typical for the index of inequality.
One can also adopt a criterion to unambiguously determine a division without use of divisor methods, such as minimizing the sum of squares (see Łyko and Rudek 2013 
Criteria of the index of disproportionality
In this paper, the index of disproportionality will be the function : × → [0, ∞), where ∈ ( , ) and ∈ ℝ., satisfying the following criteria: 
Remarks on criteria
Some authors extend the canon of indices of inequality by decomposability criterion, postulating correlation between the general value of the index for the entire set and the values of indices evaluated for arbitrarily selected subsets. This condition is invalid when the domain is the set of determined divisions.
The values of indices are determined by the structure of the set of integer divisions; whether this criterion is satisfied depends on division, not on the function. Modifying the number of either agents or goods implies the change of the domain.
The Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is a standard condition that should be satisfied by the index of inequality. Taagepera and Grofman (2003) define the Dalton's principle of transfers 3 as follows: "when a seat is transferred from a richer component to a poorer one, the disproportionality index should decrease".
Such interpretation needs a more precise definition of terms 'richer' and 'poorer' in the context of proportional division. Is richer the one that has got more apart from considering due claims or the one with greater representativeness? Being aware of this issue, Taagepera and Grofman examine both possibilities, however, as demonstrated in Goldenberg and Fisher (2017) , their classification according to this principle includes some errors. Koppel and Diskin (2009) provide an analogue of this condition defining a segment between the structure of claims and the structure of goods . If the vector of claims ′ belongs to this segment, then ( e , ) < ( , ) holds. Such statement is too restrictive, because the structure of a set of integer divisions leads to a case when for every division there is no division whose structure belongs to 3 Hugh Dalton was the first to formalize the principle in 1920, however at the same time Arthur Cecil Pigou also researched into it, hence referring to the principle in various papers is somewhat inconsistent. 37 the segment between the structure of claims and the structure of this division. If the condition of belonging to the segment is replaced by the condition that if the distance between and ′ is smaller than the distance between and , then ( e , ) < ( , ), and the condition equivalent to criterion 1 is obtained. Karpov (2008) defines the principle of transfers as follows: "If we transfer seats from an overrepresented party to an underrepresented party the value of the index should not increase". Similarly as understanding the statement given in Taagepera and Grofman (2003) , one should also realize that this transfer does not result in the modified ranking of representativeness. With this adjustment, the statement is equivalent to criterion 1 in a weak form.
In criterion 1, instead of and one can consider and , and instead of the function ( , ) -the function ( , ). This way of presentation is valuable, because the function ( , ) satisfies the criterion 3 without any further adjustments. Many authors presume from the outset that they do not deal with the set of integer divisions, but with -element vectors whose elements sum up to one. Doing so, we should bear in mind that the domain with respect to the first argument is a discrete set, and that a possible transfer or a difference between vectors is a multiple 1/ .
The function meeting criterion 1 has a uniquely defined minimum for proportional division: ( 2 , 2 ), satisfies criterion 2. To satisfy criterion 3, the division can be replaced by the structure of the division: use ( , ) instead of ( , ). One can also proceed in such a way that the value of is respectively divided or multiplied by scaling constants s and p. In other words, criteria 2 and 3 are not key in the context of proportionality or a lack of it, but in the context of desired properties of the index.
Criterion 4 is not always required (and often is not satisfied). It serves rather as a reference point when analyzing the properties of indices.
Examples of indices of disproportionality
One approach to define the index of disproportionality is the use of the concept of the vector norm. 
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The other approach exploits the fact that the vector of representativeness for the quota division has to be a constant sequence, and the more discrepancy of the vector of representativeness for a given distribution from the constant sequence, the more disproportionality of the system. This inequality can be measured by well-known indices used to measure inequality such as the Gini index, the 
Research Questions
The study aims to clarify: § how to measure the resulting disproportionality and what properties the indices of disproportionality should have. § how to take into account the condition of the division's disproportionality and what consequences it can generate. § if it is desired that the properties of disproportionality indices are unambiguously interpreted and compared.
Undoubtedly, the practice of comparing the allocations of parliamentary seats based on the ballots in a given region in various periods by the same index is correct and necessary. But what is the interpretation of the outcome when the index of a given allocation is 20 percent? Does it mean that the division is "extremely disproportional" or, quite the opposite, rather near to a proportional division?
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to present the key role of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle in defining the disproportionality indices. The aim of the study is also to define a minimum set of criteria defining the index of disproportionality taking into account the condition of the indivisibility of goods. Moreover to describe the selected properties of indices of disproportionality in order to facilitate the interpretation of the results of their use.
Research Methods
Apart from defining the minimum set of criteria of the disproportionality indices (see 2.3 and 2.4), the properties of the indices are examined by analysing the values of the indices for the extreme divisions.
Moreover, the simulations are carried out by calculating the value of selected indices on the set of all possible, acceptable divisions.
Findings
Normalized weighted mean
If a given function meets criterion 1 and is adequately construed to meet criterion 2, then meeting criterion 3 merely needs a suitable scaling. To illustrate this idea, a new index of disproportionality. is introduced below.
Assuming that each participant in division has to obtain at least one good, the vector of Due to the construction of the function, an arbitrary permutation of vectors S and P does not affect its values, thus criterion 2 is met. To satisfy criterion 3, a proper normalization is needed.
Analysis of extreme divisions
Due to criteria 2 and 3, one can limit the analysis to the sets of vectors satisfying the conditions • and vector = (0,0, … ,0,1).
In the first case, the indices based on the vector of representativeness / have no value, because https: //dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2019.02.02.5 Corresponding Author: Arkadiusz Maciuk Selection and peer-review under . The Gini index handles all these three cases equally, because the vector of representativeness / is then a vector whose all coordinates, but one, are zeroes. In this case, the Gini index equals 1 − + . .
Simulations
The interesting conclusions follow appropriate simulations evaluating the values of selected indices for all possible divisions that satisfy the condition stipulating that a greater agent does not get less than a smaller agent. Table 1 presents one example of simulation, whereas the presented conclusions reflect a greater number of simulations. The d'Hondt index is not respectively distinct, i.e. it combines different divisions, The probability that at least two divisions will have the same value almost indicates certainty. To a lesser degree, the Maximum Deviation index and the Duncan index also combine divisions. In case of the Least squares index, the Saint-Laguë index and the Sine index, the probability that at least two divisions will have the same value is very small. 
Conclusion
When examining the proportionality or its lack, the key criterion for the underlying function is to satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. Proceeding to select a "fair" division, i.e. the division "nearest"
to the proportional division from a given group of divisions by means of the index of dispsroportionality is a rational method. In case of doubts as to which index of disproportionality should be selected, one can apply several indices at the same time, whereas the d'Hondt index is not recommended, as well as simultaneous usage of the Least squares index with the Maximum Deviation and the Duncan indices.
Among extant indices, the properties of the Least squares index, the Sine index and the Saint-Laguë index are eminent, but the Saint-Laguë index does not satisfy the normalized criterion.
